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Abstract
This paper uses rich rm-level data for the UK to investigate the link between rms'
nancial health and export exit, paying attention to the ERM currency crisis and the
global nancial crisis. Our results show that deterioration in the nancial position
of rms has increased the hazard of export exit during the 2007-09 crisis but has no
signicant eect on the early 1990s crisis. We also explore the extent to which rms
in nancially vulnerable industries face greater sensitivity of export exit to nancial
conditions. We conclude that rms in sectors with great reliance on external nance
experience higher hazards of exiting the export market during the 2007-09 crisis.
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1 Introduction
It has been well documented that trade declined very strongly as a result of the recent global
nancial crisis. For example, data in the World Trade Report 2012 show that the average
export growth was around 2% and -12%, respectively, in 2008 and 2009, and rebounded to
+ 14 and + 5% in 2010 and 2011, respectively (WTO (2012)). There have been various
explanations for this trade collapse during the crisis, attributing it to strong fall in demand,
a rise in protectionism, a domino eect because of global value chains, or restrictions in the
access to nance for exporters (e.g., Baldwin and Evenett (2009), Chor and Manova (2012)
and Bricongne et al. (2012)).
In this paper we are concerned with the implications of this crisis for export market exit
of rms. While studies based on rm-level data (see Bricongne et al. (2012), Paravisini et al.
(2015)) generally conclude that most of the changes in export performance during the crisis
are due to adjustments at the intensive margin, adjustments along the external margin
may, in contrast to the intensive margin, have severe prolonged consequences for a country's
export performance. Given that there are substantial sunk costs for (re-)entering export
markets, rms exiting from the export market during the crisis are unlikely to re-enter again
immediately after the negative shock disappears. Instead, it is likely that they will remain
out of the export market. This is the phenomenon known as \Hysteresis" in exports (Baldwin
(1990), Roberts and Tybout (1997)).1 If hysteresis is important (and empirical estimates of
sunk costs of exporting, such as by Das et al. (2007) or Roberts and Tybout (1997) suggest
that it is), then the exit triggered by the crisis may lead to a permanent reduction of the
number of exporters in a country even after the crisis, i.e., export activity may become more
concentrated among a smaller number of rms.
This has potentially important policy implications for countries engaged in promoting
export performance. The British government agency UK Trade & Investment, for example,
1Impullitti et al. (2013) have recently embedded this idea in a general equilibrium model with heteroge-
nous rms, where sunk costs of export entry and uncertainty about rm eciency lead to hysteresis in rms'
export market participation.
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appears to have a strong focus on assisting rms to start exporting, i.e., increase the number
of rms exporting rather than just the overall quantity of exports.2 In this case, rms
dropping out of the export market should be of high concern to policy makers.
One important factor that might be held accountable for the decrease in the number
of exporters is access to external nance. As Amiti and Weinstein (2011) discuss, exports
are highly dependent on access to nance, much more so than domestic operations of rms.
Hence, a lack of nance may also cause rms to exit the export market. Of course, corpo-
rate funding (or the lack thereof) has been a major concern for policy makers during the
recent nancial crisis. Serious concerns have been raised regarding the ability of banks to
continue lending to rms after the massive losses that they incurred with the collapse of
the nancial market. Published evidence in the Quarterly Bulletin of the Bank of Eng-
land (Bell and Young (2010)), reveals a substantial tightening in credit supply in Britain
from mid-2007 and documents an increase in loan spreads on small and medium enterprises
(SMEs).
In this paper we investigate whether export market exit has increased during the crisis,
whether a rm's nancial position can explain rm export exit, and whether the importance
of nancial health was more pronounced during the crisis period. In order to help identi-
cation of such eects, we also make use of a sector level measure of nancial vulnerability
in the spirit of Manova et al. (2015), which allows us to compare the importance of rms'
nancial health in sectors with dierent levels of nancial vulnerability.
The analysis is conducted using rm level data for the UK. The focus on the UK allows
us to examine one other episode in recent economic history, namely the 1991-1993 ERM cur-
rency crisis, as a comparison to the global nancial crisis (GFC). In the early 1990s, the UK
entered a recession. As the UK was a member of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM), interest rates were maintained at unsustainably high rates, which eventually led to
the UK suspending its ERM membership. This led to a drop in interest rates and a strong
2See their information at http://www.ukti.gov.uk/de_de/export.html
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devaluation of Sterling. We investigate whether this crisis also had implications for export
market exit.
While both crises meant a recession for the UK, a distinct dierence is that the ERM
crisis was not a global phenomenon - in contrast to the 2007 nancial crisis. Also, and more
importantly from our point of view, there is no indication that the ERM crisis led to a severe
cut in access to nance, again a strong dierence with the nancial crisis.
If the reduction in the supply of funding and the increase in the cost of borrowing during
the 2007-09 crisis have played an eminent role, we might expect rms' nancial health to
be a more important predictor of export market exit during that crisis than out of it. This,
however, would not be expected during the ERM crisis as the nancial environment for rms
was not altered during that period. Hence, we can use this episode as a sort of placebo test
of the plausibility of the results we obtain for the importance of nancial variables during
the GFC crisis.
Our paper relates to the literature studying the link between exports and nance, and the
economic crisis in particular. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) present a comprehensive study of
the link between rms' exports at the intensive margin and nance, focusing on the health
of the bank providing access to credit. They look at the Japanese nancial crisis from 1990
to 2010. Chor and Manova (2012) use product level data on US imports, investigating the
role of credit conditions as the main culprit for reducing trade during the crisis. Due to the
nature of their data they cannot look at intensive vs extensive margins at the rm level,
however.
More closely related to our work is Bricongne et al. (2012), who also investigate the eects
of the crisis, and focus on nancial variables at the rm level. However, they strongly focus
on the intensive margin in their empirical analysis, while we concentrate on the extensive
margin. Studies by Askenazy et al. (2011) and Engel et al. (2013) also consider the role of
nancial indicators in exporting. The former study assesses theoretically and empirically
the role of credit constrains in export market entry and exit, while the latter investigates
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the characteristics of companies deciding to participate in foreign markets and engage in
exporting or foreign direct investment.3 Both studies use French rm-level data to look at
the extensive margin but neither of them assess the impact of rm-specic interest rate on
the hazards of export exit or consider the role of the recent nancial crisis.4
We contribute to this literature by specically focusing on export market exit of rms,
an issue that is highly relevant also from a policy point of view. We are the rst to compare
and contrast the determinants of export market exit, and in particular the role of nancial
health at the rm level, during the GFC and ERM crises. As discussed above, we would
expect to nd dierences for these two crises, and this is what is reected in our empirical
results. We also look at the re-entry of export market exiters, an issue that, to the best of
our knowledge, has not been considered in the previous literature.
To preview our ndings, we nd indeed that export market exit has increased during
economic crises. This holds for the ERM as well as the GFC crises. We also nd that the
role of rms' nancial status in export failure is signicantly more important in the 2007-09
crisis compared to the pre-crisis period. This, however, does not appear to be the case for
the ERM crisis. Hence, in line with our expectations, access to nance was important during
the nancial crisis, but did not appear to be a major issue during the ERM crisis. We also
nd that only about 21% of exiters re-enter export markets during our period of observation.
These are rms that are more protable and less indebted than permanent exiters.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses in more detail the link
between nance and exit from the export market during extreme economic events. Section 3
presents the rm level data and Section 4 outlines the methodology. Section 5 discusses our
econometric results, robustness checks are reported in Section 6, while Section 7 presents an
3There are also other studies which suggest that rm nancial health matters in exporting decisions, see
for example Minetti and Zhu (2011), Berman and Hericourt (2010), Forlani (2010), Bellone et al. (2010),
and Greenaway et al. (2007). At the bank-level, Paravisini et al. (2015) shows that negative credit shocks
reduce the volume of exports for rms that continue exporting to a given product-destination market.
4There are also a number of papers that have investigated rm exit from export markets in general
(e.g., Girma et al. (2003) and Harris and Li (2011) for the UK, Ilmakunnas and Nurmi (2010) for Finland,
Hiller et al. (2013) for Denmark, and Alvarez and Lopez (2008) for Chile).
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extension where we look specically at export exiters that re-enter export markets. Section
8 concludes.
2 Background
The ERM crisis during 1991 to 1993 and the global nancial crisis between 2007 and 2009
had dire eects for the UK economy but international trade responded to the downturns
in a strikingly dierent manner. In the early 1990s, the UK entered a recession. As the
UK was a member of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), interest rates were
maintained at unsustainably high rates, which eventually led to the UK suspending its ERM
membership. This led to a drop in interest rates and a strong devaluation of Sterling. The
low value of sterling provided a strong boost to the UK total trade balance. Most of the
UK's main trading partners were experiencing moderately strong growth meaning that UK
exports were supported by foreign demand. Growth in the exports of goods picked up,
particularly in capital goods, motor vehicles and other consumer goods (see Fender (2011)).
Surpluses in business and nancial services also increased signicantly.
The global nancial crisis originated in the US but quickly spread to other economies
with second-round eects in the UK. The eective sterling exchange rate fell during the
2007-09 nancial crisis narrowing the trade decit. The level of sterling and the global
demand aected the exporting behaviour of rms. In particular, the fall in export demand
was outweighed by the depreciation of sterling, thus, aecting positively UK goods exports
which have been broadly stable (Kamath (2011)).
To provide a simple visual account of the response of rms' exporting during dierent
economic periods we present Figures 1 to 3, based on our data that we describe in more
detail in the next section. Figure 1 shows the share of exporters in our data throughout the
sample period. We observe that this share rose steadily during the 1990s and early 2000s,
even through the ERM crisis period. We do, however, see a severe drop in the share during
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the GFC 2007 - 2009. This picture is mirrored somewhat in Figure 2, which depicts the
share of export exiters in total exporters. This share increased dramatically between 2007
and 2009, while there is no corresponding increase during the ERM crisis in 1991 to 1993.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the export intensity of the average exporting rm. This has increased
steadily over the period analysed, and only dipped slightly during the GFC. This indicates
the growing dependence on foreign market.
Insert Figures 1 - 3 here
Overall, these gures support the narrative we provided in the introduction, namely, that
the global nancial crisis may have had severe implications for the exit of exporters, while
there may be no corresponding evidence suggesting similar eects during the earlier ERM
crisis.
To further ll out the picture of the two downturns we should also note that external
nance responded dierently to the events. This makes each crisis distinct with respect to
nancial structure. In the UK, business lending, which had been falling steadily since 2008,
plunged below $400 bill. by the beginning of May 2013. That is 20% below its level four
years prior. Participants in the Funding for Lending Scheme group, which includes all of
the big high-street banks except HSBC, cut credit by $300 mill. in the rst quarter of 2013
(The Economist (2013)). Bell and Young (2010) nd evidence of a substantial tightening in
credit supply in the UK economy from mid-2007. They argue that loan spreads on SMEs rose
during the crisis period, with syndicated loans presenting a sharp increase from mid-2008.5
On the other hand, there is no indication that the ERM crisis led to a severe cut in access
5The UK was no exception during the crisis. A recent US study shows that banks with less deposit
nancing and more credit lines outstanding reduced the number of loans and cut their lending during the
crisis (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)). Further evidence is provided by Santos (2011), who nds that loan
spreads increased during the crisis whereas the size of loans decreased. In addition, banks with larger losses
during the crisis increased the spreads on their loans to bank-dependent borrowers only. Evidence for Europe
provided by Iyer et al. (2014), also shows that banks decreased their credit supply to rms during the 2007-09
crisis. The drop in credit supply was stronger for small rms which could not compensate the reduction in
loan supply via other sources of debt.
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to nance, which is a strong dierence to the recent nancial crisis.
In sum, the background of the two crises episodes suggests that they display striking
dierences in exporting and access to nance. By using a rich rm level data-set we provide
compelling evidence for the dierential eect of these crises on export exit.
3 Data and summary statistics
3.1 Data and variables description
To assess the link between rms' nancial conditions and their probability to exit the export
markets, we construct our dataset from the prot and loss and balance sheet data gathered
by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing in the FAME database. Firms are included in
the database if they have a turnover of at least $1.5m, pre-tax prots of $150,000 or more,
or shareholders funds of at least $1.5m, and provided that the accounts are within the last
ve years (live or dissolved).6
To construct our dataset, we use the FAME October 2010, October 2008, February
2005 editions and archived FAME 1998 and 1994. In line with Javorcik and Li (2013) and
Guariglia et al. (2016), we take this approach to address potential attrition bias since FAME
keeps only rms that have not been inactive for more than four years. For example, if only
the 2010 version of FAME were used, we would miss rms that exited by 2006 or possibly
2005. Thus, our data-set is able to track rm exits up to the earlier part of the sample
period. The time period covered by our data is 1989-2009.
In addition to nancial information, FAME also assigns companies a four-digit UK SIC
code which we use to classify rms and construct industry dummy variables. Our sample is
6A maximum of 10 years of complete data history can be downloaded at once. Note that three types
of access to the FAME dataset are available. Type C gives access to all rms in the database, type B
gives access to the top 322,846 rms, and type A to the top 139,901 rms. We have access to Type A.
The information for public companies is collected from the annual reports as soon as they are published,
rather than waiting for the accounts to be led at Companies House. FAME has information on all UK and
Irish registered companies, including recently incorporated companied who have yet to le their rst set of
accounts.
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limited to rms that operate in the manufacturing industry. The share of exporting rms
in our sample is 39% which is slightly higher than Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) and lower
compared to Greenaway et al. (2007). Both papers employ the FAME data with the former
to nd that 28% of the UK rms export their products and the latter 62%.
Our database includes a majority of rms (99%) which are not traded on the stock
market or which are not quoted on alternative exchanges such as the Alternative Investment
Market (AIM) and the O-Exchange (OFEX) market. This feature of the data allows for
a wide degree of variation across observations in our sample. A distinctive characteristic is
that not only small and medium sized rms are included in our sample but also some large
rms that are more likely to export. Having such detailed nancial data is of particular
importance for the evaluation of rms' probability to exit the export market given the
high degree of heterogeneity across rms. Private companies in our data are generally the
smallest, youngest, and most-bank dependent rms. They are therefore more likely than
public companies to face nancial constraints and diculties in accessing bank nance.
In order to clean our data we apply selection criteria that are common in the literature,
and exclude rm-years with negative sales. To control for the potential inuence of outliers,
we drop observations in the 0.5 percent from the upper and the lower tails of the distribution
of the regression variables. These cut-os are aimed at eliminating extraordinary rm shocks,
or coding errors. Next, we delete from our sample rms that report only consolidated
accounts, to avoid double-counting rms and subsidiaries or operations abroad. Our nal
panel has an unbalanced structure with a total of 469,757 annual observations (rm-years)
on 42,562 UK rms.
Looking at the quartile distribution of various size measures in Table A1, we observe the
variation over rms in terms of turnover, total assets and number of employees. The median
UK rm in our sample has an average of 83 employees, $2.6 m. assets and $6.5 m. turnover
which falls in the small and medium-sized enterprise category.7
7In the UK, sections 382 and 465 of the Companies Act 2006 dene a SME for the purpose of accounting
requirements. According to this, a small company is one that has a turnover of not more than $6.5 m., a
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We dene Export Exiters as those rms that exported in t-1 and t-2 but not in t. In
order to correctly identify rms which denitely exit the foreign market and do not start
exporting again during our sample period, export re-entrants do not count as exiters.8
In the econometric analysis we model rms' export market exit conditional on a number of
rm level covariates, where we are particularly interested in the impact of nancial variables
which are proxies for the rm's nancial health. To do so, we follow the literature on export
participation (Greenaway et al. (2007), Bellone et al. (2010) and Bricongne et al. (2012))
and employ a debt variable (DEBT ), which is measured as the rm's short-term debt to
current liabilities. A high debt ratio is associated with a worse balance sheet situation. This
may increase moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and lead to the inability of rms
to obtain external nance at a reasonable cost. In addition, high debt values may become
obstructive for the operation and eventually for the existence of rms in the export market.
We should expect then highly indebted rms to be less capable of attracting investment
capital hence, facing a higher probability of exiting the export market.
We also include the protability ratio (PROFIT ) dened as the ratio of rm's prots
before interests and tax to its total assets. This measures the importance of internal funds
for the operations of a rm.9 We anticipate more protable rms to be more likely to survive
in the export market, as they are less reliant on external nance.
When regressing export market exit on rm's nancial health the latter is likely to be
endogenous, as badly performing rms are likely to be exiters, which in turn may impact
on their credit worthiness. In order to identify an eect from nancial health on export
market exit more convincingly, we follow Manova et al. (2015) and employ two measures of
sectors' nancial vulnerability which can be considered exogenous to rms. We interact these
with the rm level indicators of nancial health. The idea is that if poor nancial health
balance sheet total of not more than $3.26 m. and not more than 50 employees. A medium-sized company
has a turnover of not more than $25.9 m., a balance sheet total of not more than $12.9 m. and not more
than 250 employees.
8However, we also look in an extension at dierences between these permanent exiters and those rms
that exit and re-enter the export market during our sample period.
9It can also proxy for a rm's eciency.
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increases the risk of export market exit, we would expect higher exit risks in nancially more
vulnerable sectors. This eect should be higher for rms with poorer nancial health than
for those with a good nancial situation in the same sector.
As in Manova et al. (2015) we use two measures of sectors' nancial vulnerability. Firstly,
the external nance dependence of a sector which measures the share of capital expenditure
in a sector not nanced from cash ow over total sectoral capital expenditure.10 Secondly,
the ratio of inventories to sales. Note that both proxies come from Kroszner et al. (2007)
who in turn follow the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998). As pointed out in these
earlier studies, the basic idea is that these measures reect technological features of the
production process in a given industry, which are beyond the control of individual rms and
thus exogenous. We calculate these measures for our analysis using Compustat data for all
publicly traded US companies. They are available for 36 ISIC three-digit sectors, which we
match to UK SIC 2007 four-digit sectors.
To further aid identication of an eect of nancial health, we also control for rm size and
age, as suggested by e.g., Greenaway et al. (2007), Bellone et al. (2010) and Bricongne et al.
(2012). SIZE is dened as the rm's real total assets whereas, AGE is dened as the
dierence between the current year and the date of incorporation. Small rms may face
higher restrictions on capital markets leading to a higher risk of insolvency and illiquidity
and young rms have to achieve an eciency level to keep pace with competitors. As time
goes by, rms go through a process of learning about their relative eciency and market
competitiveness.
3.2 Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in our empirical models for the en-
tire sample. Means and standard deviations of the main variables of interest are reported for
10Specically, cash ow from operations is dened as the sum of funds from operations, decreases in
receivables, decreases in inventories, and increases in payables. Capital expenditures is dened as the ratio
of capital expenditures to net property, plant and equipment.
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the entire sample (column 1), exiters and non-exiters (columns 2 and 3); and crisis and tran-
quil periods (columns 5, 6, 8 and 9). We dene the GFC as 2007 - 2009 and the ERM crisis
as 1991-1993. To avoid overlap between `normal times' and credit crunch periods, we ex-
clude the 2007-09 years from the ERM dummy and the 1991-93 years from the GFC dummy.
Insert Table 1 here
In columns 4, 7 and 10 we report p-values of a test for the equality of means. Starting
with proxies for rms' nancial condition, we observe that export exiters are more indebted,
less protable and they are more likely to operate in sectors with high external nance
dependence compared to non-exiters.11 Exiters are also larger rms. There is not statistically
signicant dierence in age between exiters and non-exiters. This preliminary evidence
points to the fact that export market exit and a deterioration in a rm's nancial health are
correlated.
When comparing the 1991-93 and 2007-09 crisis periods with the tranquil years of our
sample (columns 5, 6, 8 and 9), it can be seen that rms operating in highly nancial
vulnerable sectors are in greater external nance need during the 2007-09 crisis compared
to the remaining period. The exit rate is also higher during the GFC than out of the crisis.
These dierences are statistically signicant at the 1% level (column 10). It is noteworthy
that there are no signicant dierences in these two variables between the 1991-93 crisis and
the rest of the sample. This preliminary evidence is in line with the idea that during the
GFC the tightening in credit supply might have had a detrimental impact on the decision
of rms to continue their operations in export markets given the excess need for external
11We have considered whether export exit is related to rm exit or rm death. In line with the relevant
literature (see for example Guariglia et al. (2016)), we dene a rm as failed in a given year when its status
is that of receivership, liquidation, or dissolved. A simple correlation statistic between exit from the export
market and failures shows a positive but weak correlation equal to 0.02. In addition, Figure A1, shown in
the Appendix, depicts the evolution of the above variables over time. We can observe that there is a mild
relation between export exit and failure but the former shows a steeper increase in the later part of the
sample period. We conclude that export exit and failure are only mildly positively correlated.
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nance of particular manufacturing sectors.
Focusing on the remaining proxies for nancial health, we note that protability is lower
during crises than in other times. In addition, we nd that the value of debt ratio is similar
in GFC period and in normal times but higher during the ERM crisis. This is consistent
with the notion that rms took a substantial amount of short-term debt in the pre-crisis
period and perhaps were unable to extend it further in the later years of our sample. Bank
lending was not aected by the ERM crisis and access to short-term nance was not an issue
for rms during the early 1990s. Mean dierences are statistically signicant in all cases.
Figures 4-5 depict the evolution of debt and prot for export exiters and non-exiters.
It is clear that rms exiting the export market have a higher debt ratio and lower prots
compared to their counterparts. This indicates that exiters are in bad nancial shape as they
are more indebted and less protable. The gap in the level of indebtedness and protability
between the two groups of rms widens during the 2007-09 crisis. It is noteworthy that
the lowest debt level and the highest prot level are observed after the suspension of the
ERM membership. This is a time when interest rates fell and the exchange rate depreciated
leading to an increase in export growth and rms' surpluses.
Insert Figures 4 - 5 here
To summarise, two points can be highlighted from these preliminary statistics. First, a
rm's nancial health appears to be correlated with export market exit. Second, sectors'
nancially vulnerability also seem to be related to the probability that a company will exit
the export market. In the following sections we provide formal econometric evidence to
account for the confounding eects of nancial and other factors that may inuence the
incidence of export exit.
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4 Econometric methodology
We set out a benchmark model to estimate how rms' probability to exit the export market
(its hazard) is aected by their nancial conditions:
h(j;X) = 1  exp[ exp(1X + 2Y + j)] (4.1)
The discrete-time hazard function h(j;K) shows the interval hazard for the period be-
tween the beginning and the end of the jth year after the rst appearance of the rm. Y
denotes a vector of control variables SIZE and AGE. Our model also includes a full set
of time and industry dummies to control for industry and macroeconomic eects and their
interactions to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in credit demand.12 j is
the log of the dierence between the integrated baseline hazard evaluated at the end and the
beginning of the interval. It thus captures duration dependence.13
X is a vector of nancial variables PROFIT , dened as the ratio of the rm's prots
before interest and tax to its total assets14, and DEBT , calculated as the rm's short term
debt to current liabilities. Both variables capture dierent aspects of the rm's nancial
health. The sign and signicance of 1 shows the importance of nancial health on the
probability of rms to exit the export market.
As we are examining the likelihood of exiting, an OLS estimation would be inappropriate.
Rather, we use a complementary log-log model (cloglog), a discrete time version of the Cox
proportional hazard model.15 We apply the Huber-White sandwich or robust estimator.
In order to examine whether the hazard of export market exit diers in crisis years
12Ilmakunnas and Nurmi (2010) and Alvarez and Lopez (2008) control for macroeconomic inuences and
they nd that changes in real exchange rate and real GDP can aect rms' export exit.
13We do not impose any restrictions on these parameters; rather, we estimate a full set of j time dummies.
14We should acknowledge that there is potential endogeneity between prots and export survival. Indeed,
a rm can have decreasing prots and increasing debt because her products are losing competitiveness. The
rm would have been anyway close to an exit, even without a negative exogenous shock. We address this
issue using IV techniques in the robustness section of the paper.
15To capture the particular nature of the dataset, given that it is collected on a yearly basis, the cloglog
model is more appropriate than the standard Cox model. See Jenkins (2005) for an excellent overview of
complementary log-log and proportional hazard models.
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compared to tranquil periods, we augment Equation 4:1 with a crisis dummy (Crisis),
which either takes value one over the period 2007-09 or the period 1991-93. The crisis might
have an indirect impact on exit by magnifying the eect of proxies for nancial health on
rms' likelihood to exit the export market.
h(j;X) = 1  exp[ exp(1X + 2X  (Crisis) + 3Crisis+ 4Y + j)] (4.2)
Deteriorations in economic conditions increase the cost of nance, which in turn weak-
ens rms' balance sheet positions, thus inuencing their activities. In these circumstances,
worsening of our proxies for nancial health might increase the risk of export failure during
the crisis. The sign and signicance of the interacted term will reveal the extent to which
the impact of nancial conditions on export market exit diers during tranquil and turbu-
lent periods. We expect the eects of changes in the level of nancial characteristics on
rms' export market exit to be stronger during the crisis (i.e. we expect to observe that
1 + 2 > 1).
In order to help identifying an eect from nancial health on export market exit more
convincingly, we follow (Manova et al. (2015)) and include in our model a variable capturing
a sectors' nancial vulnerability. This can be considered exogenous to rms.16 The idea is
that if poor nancial health increases the risk of export market exit, we would expect higher
exit risks in nancially more vulnerable sectors. This eect should be higher for rms with
poorer nancial health than for those with a good nancial situation in the same sector.17
We dene a dummy variable for highly nancial vulnerable rms to investigate whether
rms operating in manufacturing sectors with greater dependence on external nance are
more likely to exit the export market if their nancial condition deteriorates. A rm is dened
as (HFV ) if the sectoral nancial vulnerability measure is above the median of the external
16Financial dependence across sectors is exogenous to individual rms and although we cannot claim that
we account for exogenous shocks to rms' availability of external nance (such as Paravisini et al. (2015) and
Amiti and Weinstein (2011) who use matched rm-bank data), this partially mitigates endogeneity concerns.
17A recent study by Fontagne and Gaulier (2009) nds that the crisis hit exporting rms in sectors relying
on external nance more severely.
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nance dependence/inventories ratio. We then interact our nancial health measures (prot
and debt) with the high nancial vulnerability dummy.
As pointed out above, following Manova et al. (2015), we employ two measures of sectors'
nancial vulnerability, namely the external nance dependence and the ratio of inventories
to sales to capture dierent aspects of rms' sensitivity to the availability of outside capital.
We intend to assess whether changes in the nancial condition of rms in and out-of-the
crisis will have a dierential impact on their probability to exit the export markets, taking
into account sectors' nancial vulnerability. We anticipate more nancially constrained rms,
which operate in highly nancial vulnerable sectors, to face a greater probability of export
exit during the recent global crisis.
We modify equation 4:2 to contain interaction terms between the HFV dummy, the
Crisis dummy and vector X. This yields the following empirical model:
h(j;X) = 1  exp[ exp(1X  Crisis HFV + 2X HFV + 3X  Crisis
+ 4X + 5Crisis+ 6HFV + 7Crisis HFV + 8Y + j)] (4.3)
This makes our analysis akin to a dierence-in-dierences approach in a linear model, as
we compare HFV and non-HFV rms before and during the crisis.
The sign and signicance of the triple interaction term reveals whether rms in high
nancially vulnerable sectors are more or less likely to survive in the export market during
the crises compared to low nancially vulnerable sectors during tranquil periods. If the
credit supply and the cost of external nance matter, then included interaction terms should
be statistically signicant and important for the 2007-09 crisis. Should the reduction in the
supply of funding and the increase in the cost of borrowing during the GFC crisis have played
an eminent role, we might expect a higher probability of exit for exporters. However, results
should be less signicant during the ERM crisis, as this did not aect access to nance.
16
5 Econometric results
5.1 Survival in the export market during two crises periods
In order to provide a benchmark we estimate the most parsimonious model without inter-
action terms. Before we delve into the results, we report the prole of the estimated js in
Figure A2 to see the trend in the hazard rate of exiting the export market for the average
rm. It paints a similar picture to Figure 2, since there is a steady increase in the average
hazard rate of export market exit, which becomes more pronounced in the later part of the
sample period. In addition, in Table A2 we report the estimated js for various industries
during the crises years along with the measure of external nance dependence.18 We observe
a correlation between these gures (correlation coecient is 0.42), especially for the most
recent nancial crisis.
The results of estimating equation 4.1 are presented in Table 2. Note that the predicted
probability of exiting the export market evaluated at the mean of the independent variables,
is 19%.
Insert Table 2 here
The rst column of the Table presents the direct eect of the nancial variables without
considering crises. Columns 2 and 3 report the direct and indirect eects of the ERM and
the GFC on the hazard of export market exit.
To start with, column 1 shows that protability negatively aects the likelihood of rms
exiting the export market. As expected, more protable rms are more likely to continue
nancing their operations in the export market. The level of debt is found to exert a positive
eect on the hazard of export market exit. High levels of debt may make it more dicult
to obtain additional external nance, and may lead to a higher probability of export failure.
18These are recovered from estimations of equation 4.1 for each sector separately.
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This is in line with expectations since evidence presented by other studies ( Greenaway et al.
(2007), Bellone et al. (2010) and Bricongne et al. (2012)) reveal a negative impact of debt
on export entry and export performance.
In columns 2 and 3 we include the interactions between the nancial health measures
and the crisis terms in order to assess the dierential impact of the 1991-93 and the 2007-09
crises, respectively, on the hazard of export exit. We also include a crisis dummy on its own.
Note that in both cases this dummy returns a positive coecient, indicating that both types
of crises increased the overall hazard of exiting the export market for rms.
Considering the interaction terms we nd, as expected, an important dierence between
the two crises. We do not nd any change in the impact of the proxies for nancial constraints
during the 1991-93 crisis. As argued above, this crisis did not lead to reductions in the supply
of nance available to rms and, hence, should not be expected to show up in the interactions.
This is dierent for the 2007-09 nancial crisis, which clearly cut access to nance for
businesses. This is reected in our results, as we nd statistically signicant interactions in
column 3. This implies that the importance of protability, i.e, access to internal funding,
has increased during the crisis. During economic downturns the external nance premium
increases for some rms and access to external funding might become prohibitively expen-
sive. Therefore, protable rms are more likely to overcome nancial problems and continue
operating in international markets. Taking the point estimate at face value, our estimation
suggests that a one-percent reduction in protability increased the hazard of exiting export
markets by roughly 12.6 percentage points during the crisis compared to 4.6 percentage
points outside the crisis.19
Similarly, the adverse eect of high debt levels has become stronger during the crisis,
suggesting that highly leveraged rms face greater diculties obtaining funds on the markets,
especially during extreme economic conditions. A one-percent increase in debt is associated
with a rise in the predicted exit probability of around 6.9 percentage points in 2007-09 and
19This is calculated at the mean exit probability of 19%, using the exponentiated coecients
[exp(0.216+0.295)-1]*19 and [exp(0.216)-1]*19 respectively.
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1.3 percentage points in tranquil years.
5.2 Financial vulnerability, crises periods and export exit
In this section we set out to investigate whether rms with dierent industry aliation
exhibit dierent eects of the proxies for nancial health on their survival in the export
market in and out of crises years. A priori, we would expect changes in rms' nancial
conditions to make rms operating in nancially dependent industries more vulnerable during
the GFC crisis, as business lending was aected. This should not be the case during the
ERM crisis which had no impact on lending conditions.
In order to look at these issues we estimate equation (4.3) where we interact our nancial
health indicators with the crisis dummy and the HFV dummy to gauge the extent to which
the eects of rms' nancial condition on the likelihood of export exit dier for rms with
high compared to low sectoral dependence on external nance in and out of crisis periods.
The empirical results are reported in Table 3. In columns 1-2 we compare the ERM with
the GFC crisis for rms in sectors with high external nance dependence and in columns 3-4
a similar comparison is carried out for rms in sectors with high inventories ratio. In both
samples, we nd that rms in sectors with great reliance on external nance also experience
higher hazards of exiting the export market. A high sectoral nancial vulnerability also
exacerbates the importance of protability for such exit. Our results do bring to the fore an
important dierence between the two crises, however. During the 2007-09 nancial crisis, the
triple interaction term shows that the importance of protability is higher during the crisis,
and that this crisis eect is higher for rms in nancially more vulnerable sectors. During
the 1991-93 crisis, there is no such magnifying eect - all rms are aected, irrespective of
whether they are in or out of crisis times. This again indicates the dierence between these
two crises.
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Insert Table 3 here
We see a very similar picture when looking at the interactions involving the debt variable.
High debt is associated with high likelihood of exiting the export market. This is particularly
the case for HFV rms, and even more so for HFV rms during the nancial crisis. The
interactions are statistically insignicant for the ERM crisis.
During the nancial crisis, access to capital markets was likely to be prohibitively ex-
pensive for rms that face credit constraints and which are more likely to depend on banks
for external nance. It is in fact documented that during the crisis, loan spreads increased
(Santos (2011) and Bell and Young (2010)) leading to a drop in the demand for loans and a
shift to alternative sources of nance. It is also noteworthy that banks tightened lending stan-
dards as they changed their risk appetite. As a consequence of this, those bank-dependent
rms had to scale back their investment projects and restrain their activities. Therefore, it
is not surprising that rms in nancially dependent industries faced an increase in the risk
to exit the export market during the nancial crisis. This was not the case during the ERM
crisis.
In sum, the greater sensitivities of export exit to changes in nancial conditions docu-
mented for HFV rms during the GFC crisis suggest that exporters in nancially vulnerable
sectors were aected much more than those in other sectors. This suggests that nance mat-
ters for export market exit.
6 Robustness checks
In this section we provide a series of robustness checks. Firstly, we limit our sample to rms
that start to export over the period we analyze. Secondly, we examine whether our ndings
remain persistent when we control for possible endogeneity problems using an instrumental
variables approach. Finally, we slightly change the denition of the crises periods.
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6.1 Using only rms that start to export over the period we ana-
lyze
To start with, we follow Ilmakunnas and Nurmi (2010) and estimate an alternative model
where we only consider new exporters. This allows us to avoid one possible aspect of rm het-
erogeneity, namely, dierences between new and continuous exporters, which may otherwise
bias our results (Gorg and Spaliara (2014)). Hence, we evaluate the role of rms' nancial
condition and sectors' nancial vulnerability in export exit probability of rms that started
exporting for the rst time after 1990. The results are reported in Tables 4 and 5 (columns
1 and 2). We can see that overall our ndings do not change strongly compared to Tables 2
and 3.
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here
6.2 Instrumental variables
We argue above that the use of sectoral nancial indicators somewhat mitigates the problem
of the endogeneity of the rm level nancial variables, as in Manova et al. (2015). Still, in
a further robustness check we use an instrumental variables approach (columns 3 and 4 in
Tables 4 and 5). Following Duchin et al. (2010) we instrument for the rm level nancial
variables using lagged values as much as four years prior to the onset of the crisis in 2007
and two years before the 1991 crisis since data is not available before 1989. The results are
robust to this modication.
In order to test the validity and the relevance of our instruments we estimate a linear
instrumental variables model using the same set of instruments as in the IV probit model.
The Hansen J test statistic of the overidentifying restrictions suggests that our instruments
are valid and further, the Kleibergen-Paap test statistic rejects the null and suggests that the
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model is identied therefore the instruments are correlated with the endogenous variables.
6.3 Alternative denition of the crises
So far we have used years 2007-09 to dene the GFC crisis and 1991-93 for the ERM crisis.
As a robustness check, we dene the GFC as 2008-09 and the ERM as 1992-93 following
Buiter et al. (1998). Results in Tables 4 and 5 conrm the ndings discussed in section 5.
The sensitivity of the hazard of export exit to protability and debt is greater during the
nancial crisis. Once again the sensitivity appears to be more signicant during 2008-09
for rms in nancially more vulnerable sectors. Therefore, our results do not appear to be
driven by the denition of the crises dummy.
7 Export market re-entry
The evidence presented clearly indicates that export market exit has increased during the
2007-09 nancial crisis, and that the nancial condition of the rm has become more impor-
tant as a determinant of export survival during the crisis. Our analysis thus far is based on
rms that exit the export market and do not re-enter during the sample period.
However, during our sample period we also observe rms that exit and subsequently
re-enter into exporting.20 We re-dene Export Exiters as those rms that exported in t-1
and t-2 but not in t in order to account for export re-entrants. In total, we have in our
sample 9,183 rms that exited the export market during our sample period. Of those, we
observe for only 1,927 that they re-enter at some point.21 For 376 rms we can see a clear
single re-entry (exit-entry) while for the rest we nd multiple incidences of exit and re-entry.
About 70% of multiple switchers enter, exit and re-enter the export market.22 Table 6 shows
20We are not able to observe a possible re-entering for all rms (see Greenaway et al. (2007)). In particular,
those rms that exit towards the end of our period may only re-enter after 2009. Hence, our analysis can
only be interpreted as a rst stab at this issue.
21We exclude exporters who display a multiple entry pattern but end up exiting the sample.
22We have 1,927 exporters that re-enter, while total export entry is 21,306 over the period analysed, so
re-entry is a share of 9 percent of total new entry.
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the re-entry patterns in the data. Roughly 50% of those rms that show a single re-entry
are back into exporting within the rst year of exiting. About 75% of exiters re-enter within
the rst two years. This may be related to sunk costs - the knowledge of the foreign markets
does not depreciate too much over the rst two years of exiting (Roberts and Tybout (1997)).
Insert Table 6 here
Export re-entrants are arguably rms capable of switching their export status easily.
Thus, they are likely to be associated with higher levels of exibility and adaptability which
also suggests good nancial health and, hence, less susceptibility to nancial constraints
(Gorg and Spaliara (2014) and Harris and Li (2010)). To test whether exporter re-entrants
are indeed dierent from those exiters that stay out of export markets permanently we
construct a dummy which takes the value one if the rm is a re-entrant and zero if it is a
permanent exiter.23 We then regress these on rm characteristics, including the nancial
variables, as in the previous part.
Results on the probability to re-enter exporting in and out of the GFC crisis are presented
in Table 7. In column 1, we observe that protable and low indebted rms are more likely
to be re-entrants. In the next column we are interested in whether re-entry determinants
are dierent in and out of the crisis. We nd that the coecients on interacted terms are
not signicantly dierent from each other indicating the nancial exibility of re-entrants
independent of whether there is a crisis or not. However, we do nd that the crisis dummy
on its own returns a positive coecient, i.e., re-entry is more likely during bad than good
times, all other things equal.
In column 3, results indicate that protability and debt remain important factors of ex-
port re-entry but the interactions with the external nance dependence dummy appear to
be insignicant. In the nal column, we interact our health measures with the GFC dummy
23To avoid double counting, we have made sure that an exiting rm is not a re-entrant or an export starter
at the same time.
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and sector level nancial vulnerability. Results are largely insignicant, however. The only
nding is that the negative impact of debt is strengthened during the GFC crisis, as was
also found in the earlier part of the analysis.
Insert Table 7 here
Our results show that compared to permanent exiters (which was the focus of our earlier
analysis) re-entrants are less aected by a crisis or by the nancial vulnerability of the sector.
This may suggest that they are in better nancial health and less receptive to nancial
constraints than permanent exiters.
8 Conclusion
The analysis is motivated by the observation that, if sunk costs to exporting matter, then
rms that exit the export market may be likely to remain out of the export market even
after the negative shock disappears.
We use a rich and extensive data for the UK which spans two major episodes: the ERM
crisis of the 1990s and the global nancial crisis of the 2000s. These downturns share some
similarities given that they both were recessions in the UK and that the eective sterling
exchange rate fell markedly, but they also display striking dierences. The former crisis was
dierent in that the recession was not global, and also access to nance was not curtailed.
Our results for the 1991-93 period show that the role of nancial variables was not stronger
during the ERM crisis in export exit. By contrast, the global nancial crisis in 2007-2009 had
a marked impact, exacerbating the importance of rms' nancial health for export market
exit. When we account for the operation of rms in sectors of dierent nancial vulnerability,
we document greater sensitivities of export exit to changes in nancial conditions for rms
based in high nancially vulnerable industries. This eect was also stronger during the GFC
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but not during the ERM crisis. The importance of rm and sector level nancial variables,
and the dierent role of the two crises are novel ndings.
An increase in the number of rms dropping out of export markets during crises episodes
should be of concern to policy makers. These rms are unlikely to simply re-enter export
markets after the crisis, since sunk costs are important for export decisions. Instead, they
may behave just like rst time exporters, relying on the same export promotion policies as
rms that have never exported before. Given that the crises periods analysed in the present
study are very dierent from each other they elicit dierent policy responses.
If access to nance is severely restricted, as it was during the GFC, then a policy response
may be to alleviate the dearth of available funding. This may be done through focused loan
programmes, subsidies towards payment of higher interests, or grants to severely aected
rms. Such policies include the $190 billion Project Merlin, the National Loan Guarantee
Scheme the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS), and the Discount Window Facility (DWF)
which were implemented in the UK in the aftermath of the most recent crisis.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Total Sample Exiter=1 Exiter=0 Di. ERM=1 ERM=0 Di. GFC=1 GFC=0 Di.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Profit 0.081 0.074 0.083 0.000 0.069 0.082 0.000 0.071 0.082 0.000
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Debt 0.384 0.396 0.380 0.000 0.393 0.382 0.000 0.389 0.382 0.105
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
V ulnerability -0.003 0.031 -0.017 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 0.654 0.027 -0.003 0.000
(0.41) (0.43) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.42) (0.41)
Size 4.016 4.262 3.960 0.000 3.764 4.024 0.000 4.233 4.024 0.000
(1.51) (1.50) (1.51) (1.64) (1.52) (1.26) (1.52)
Age 26.398 26.544 26.365 0.163 25.822 26.337 0.002 27.537 26.337 0.000
(22.26) (22.60) (22.18) (22.99) (22.28) (21.23) (22.28)
Export Exiters 0.121 0.00 0.00 0.116 0.110 0.095 0.139 0.110 0.000
(0.33) (3.20) (3.16) (3.46) (3.20)
Observations 203,499 37,650 165,849 22,750 160,953 160.953 19,976
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Diff: is the p-value of the test
statistic for the means. Profit is measured as the ratio of rms' prots before interests and tax to its total assets. Debt is
dened as the ratio of rms' short term-debt to current liabilities . V ulnerability is captured by the external nance dependence
measure dened as the share of capital expenditures not nanced with cash ows from operations. Size is given by the log of
rms' real assets measured in thousands of UK sterling. Age is dened as the dierence between the present year and the rm's
date of incorporation. ERM takes value 1 in the years 1991-1993, and 0 otherwise (excluding 2007-09 years). GFC takes value
1 in the years 2007-2009, and 0 otherwise (excluding 1991-93 years). Export Exiters are rms that exported in t-1 and t-2 but
not in t. Export re-entrants do not count as exiters. The time period is 1989-2009.
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Table 2: Crises and Export Market Exit
Baseline ERM GFC
(1) (2) (3)
Profit -0.227*** -0.201*** -0.216***
(-6.45) (-3.42) (-5.43)
Profit*Crisis -0.175 -0.295***
(-1.49) (-2.69)
Debt 0.072*** 0.040* 0.068**
(3.53) (1.73) (2.21)
Debt*Crisis -0.061 0.245***
(-0.97) (3.68)
Size 0.121*** 0.134*** 0.134***
(33.20) (32.41) (32.46)
Crisis 0.486*** 0.652***
(7.76) (8.08)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-4.67) (-3.70) (-4.77)
Observations 198,803 178,827 176,776
Log   likelihood -94421 -85148 -83031
Notes: All estimates are obtained using a proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a rm
exits the export market in year t, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%;
**signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Time dummies, industry dummies and their interactions are included in the models.
Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 3: Financial Vulnerability, Crises and Export Exit
External Finance External Finance Inventories Inventories
Dependence Dependence Ratio Ratio
ERM GFC ERM GFC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Profit*Crisis*HFV -0.110 -0.352*** -0.115 -0.251**
(-0.51) (-2.68) (-0.48) (-2.21)
Profit*HFV 0.130* -0.138* -0.066 -0.169*
(1.66) (1.68) (-0.81) (-1.84)
Profit*Crisis -0.155 0.177* -0.130 -0.221*
(-0.91) (1.68) (-0.63) (-1.75)
Profit -0.265*** -0.264*** -0.152** -0.149**
(-4.50) (-4.49) (-2.30) (-2.25)
Debt*Crisis*HFV -0.018 0.287*** -0.120 0.214**
(-0.14) (2.66) (-0.91) (2.10)
Debt*HFV -0.069 0.119* 0.023 0.020
(-1.51) (1.82) (0.50) (0.44)
Debt*Crisis -0.101 0.195** -0.016 0.242**
(-1.07) (2.06) (-0.15) (2.31)
Debt 0.086*** 0.084** 0.035 0.135*
(2.61) (2.55) (0.96) (1.98)
HFV *Crisis 0.095 0.263** 0.072 0.135
(0.98) (2.55) (0.56) (1.05)
HFV 0.200*** 0.190*** 0.358*** 0.336***
(5.08) (4.83) (8.71) (8.17)
Crisis 0.419*** 0.700*** 0.267*** 0.724***
(4.96) (6.72) (2.84) (6.60)
Size 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.150*** 0.152***
(25.92) (25.78) (24.63) (24.86)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-4.11) (-4.86) (-3.65) (-4.52)
Observations 183,523 180,929 183,523 180,929
Log   likelihood -86886 -84637 -86805 -84599
Notes: All estimates are obtained using a proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a rm
exits the export market in year t, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%;
**signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Time dummies, industry dummies and their interactions are included in the models.
Also see notes to Tables 1 and 3.
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Table 4: Robustness: Crises and Export Market Exit
Re-dene Re-dene IV IV Alternative Alternative
sample sample crisis crisis
ERM GFC ERM GFC 1992-93 2008-09
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profit -0.028 -0.188** -0.365*** -0.348*** -0.219*** -0.224***
(-0.75) (-2.29) (-8.51) (-7.90) (-5.64) (-5.74)
Profit*Crisis -0.102 0.229** -0.183 -0.230** 0.190* -0.332***
(-1.58) (2.09) (-1.46) (2.12) (1.69) (-2.60)
Debt 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.034* 0.049* 0.053** 0.042*
(2.77) (2.71) (1.69) (1.89) (2.36) (1.86)
Debt*Crisis -0.053 0.257*** 0.089 0.109** -0.071 0.228***
(-0.80) (3.80) (1.61) (2.17) (-0.97) (2.69)
Size -0.041*** -0.040*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.135*** -0.128***
(-8.24) (-7.99) (27.83) (28.23) (33.25) (-31.91)
Crisis 0.872*** 0.765*** 0.433*** 0.289*** -0.647*** 0.458***
(12.49) (8.87) (7.36) (3.77) (-6.87) (6.74)
Age -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-2.04) (-3.57) (-3.03) (-4.27) (-4.77) (-3.74)
Observations 98,043 95,610 152,401 143,214 176,776 178,827
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 present results for a shorter sample of rms that started exporting for the rst time after 1990. In
columns 3 and 4 the specication is estimated using instrumental variable technique for probit models. Columns 5 and 6 report
results based on the 2008-09 and 1992-93 crises periods. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a rm exits the export
market in year t, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%; **signicant at
5%; *** signicant at 1%. Time dummies industry dummies and their interactions are included in the models. Also see notes
to Table 1.
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Table 5: Robustness: Financial Vulnerability, Crises and Export Exit
Re-dene Re-dene IV IV Alternative Alternative
sample sample crisis crisis
ERM GFC ERM GFC 1992-93 2008-09
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profit*Crisis*HFV 0.052 -0.290*** -0.220 -0.983** -0.062 -0.444**
(0.23) (-2.86) (-1.43) (-2.59) (-0.24) (-2.52)
Profit*HFV 0.014 -0.112** 0.183** -0.218** 0.105 -0.194*
(0.19) (-2.16) (2.12) (-2.46) (1.34) (-1.80)
Profit*Crisis -0.389** 0.134 0.174 0.496 -0.294 -0.155*
(-2.14) (0.82) (0.89) (1.35) (-1.42) (-1.71)
Profit -0.041 -0.141* -0.463*** -0.465*** -0.280*** -0.270***
(-0.72) (-1.72) (-7.20) (-7.06) (-4.70) (-4.56)
Debt*Crisis*HFV 0.039 0.227*** -0.130 0.348** 0.038 0.294**
(0.29) (2.50) (-1.05) (2.68) (0.26) (2.24)
Debt*HFV -0.106** 0.106** -0.031 0.225* -0.054 0.159*
(-2.26) (2.16) (-0.76) (1.89) (-1.20) (1.82)
Debt*Crisis -0.073 0.245** 0.180** 0.186* -0.088 0.134*
(-0.73) (2.59) (2.02) (2.00) (-0.80) (1.70)
Debt 0.122*** 0.119*** 0.053* 0.243** 0.073** 0.085***
(3.56) (3.49) (1.79) (2.43) (2.21) (2.63)
HFV *Crisis 0.134 0.149* 0.216 0.468* 0.037 0.162*
(1.15) (1.73) (0.96) (1.90) (0.32) (2.02)
HFV -0.090* 0.100** 0.100** 0.086** 0.227*** 0.206***
(-1.87) (2.08) (2.36) (2.18) (5.75) (5.20)
Crisis 0.792*** 0.687*** 0.309** 0.526*** 0.430*** 0.682***
(8.21) (6.01) (2.31) (2.97) (4.51) (5.39)
Size -0.050*** -0.049*** 0.101*** -0.101*** 0.151*** -0.156***
(-6.97) (-6.82) (16.98) (18.33) (26.31) (-26.96)
Age -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-2.08) (-3.62) (-3.11) (-4.30) (-3.86) (-4.86)
Observations 98,043 95,610 152,401 143,214 178,827 176,776
Notes: In columns 1 and 2 the estimates are obtained using a proportional hazard model. In columns 3 and 4 the estimates are
obtained using an instrumental variable technique for probit models. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a rm
exits the export market in year t, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%;
**signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Time dummies, industry dummies and their interactions are included in the models.
Also see notes to Tables 1 and 3.
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Table 6: Statistics for re-entrants
Time it takes to re-enter Number of rms Percent of re-entrants
1 188 50.04
2 97 25.79
3 30 7.97
4 22 5.85
5 14 3.72
6 11 2.92
7 10 2.65
8 4 1.06
Total single re  entrants 376 100.00
Multiple switchers 1,551
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Table 7: Export Market Re-entry
Baseline GFC External Finance External Finance
Dependence Dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Profit*Crisis*HFV 0.691
(0.93)
Profit*HFV 0.244 0.134
(0.81) (0.40)
Profit*Crisis 0.101 0.505
(0.26) (0.94)
Profit 0.196** 0.250** 0.328** 0.235*
(2.16) (2.28) (2.32) (1.97)
Debt*Crisis*HFV 0.467
(1.03)
Debt*HFV -0.174 -0.269
(-0.97) (-1.33)
Debt*Crisis -0.073 -0.999***
(-0.72) (-3.00)
Debt -0.207** -0.704*** -0.320* -0.270*
(-2.26) (-3.13) (-1.92) (-2.08)
HFV *Crisis -0.439
(-0.83)
HFV 0.829*** 0.910***
(4.19) (4.23)
Crisis 1.557*** 1.800***
(5.19) (4.29)
Size 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.019 0.031
(3.78) (3.05) (0.68) (1.07)
Age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(7.24) (7.24) (7.13) (7.14)
Observations 10,457 10,457 10,457 10,457
Log   likelihood -4656 -4650 -4644 -4636
Notes: All estimates are obtained using a proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a rm
is a switcher export, and 0 if it is an exiter exporter. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%;
**signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Time dummies, industry dummies and their interactions are included in the models.
Also see notes to Tables 1 and 3.
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Figure 1: Share of exporters
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Figure 2: Share of export exiters
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Figure 3: Export intensity
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Figure 4: Debt for exiters and non−exiters
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Figure 5: Profit for exiters and non−exiters
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Figure A1: Evolution of failure rates
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Figure A2: Evolution of gammaj
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